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Twenty-eight
years of consolidation have culminated in announcements of megamergers
by third-ranked USA Waste Services and first-ranked Waste Management
in 1998 and then of fourth-ranked Allied Waste Industries and
second-ranked Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) in 1999. In the
opinion of one leading investment analyst, consolidation could
wind down by 2001 because there are so few large independents
left, and those are generally not acquirable because of liabilities.
The endgame is upon us.
This
trend has raised concerns that significant anticompetitive conditions
might ensue in many geographic markets. The question has been
raised in markets where evergreen contracts, price discrimination,
or strategic acquisition practices by dominant firms have erected
resilient barriers to entry by new haulers. Notable concern has
arisen where large merging firms control all the local landfillsa
bottleneck in the solid waste industrycreating near insurmountable
barriers against new competitors.
Under
the antitrust statutes in the United States, the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission reviews these mergers
to determine whether the effect of the combination might be to
substantially lessen competition or to create a monopoly. The
underlying issue in merger reviews is whether the combination
will reduce competition sufficiently such that there is a significant
likelihood the merged firm, acting alone or with others, will
be able to exercise market power in the relevant market.
If
the high market concentration created by a merger raises competitive
issues, antitrust officials will also consider whether the possibility
of new entrants attracted by monopoly rents will overcome those
anticompetitive forces or whether these concerns might be outweighed
by merger-specific economic efficiencies that result from the
combination.
In
the case of the solid waste industry, consolidators have argued
that any anticompetitive impact resulting from mergers is offset
by the increased efficiency that flows from the greater route
densities that the merger makes possible.
However,
this issue is somewhat narrower in that route densities can only
improve when certain types of collection operations are combined,
namely nonfranchised residential and commercial collection. It
does not pertain to franchised collection because the franchise
provides 100% coverage of the targeted market within the franchise
area. Nor, it must be emphasized, does this potential advantage
for hauling imply that there will be efficiency advantages in
the disposal side of the operations when two waste firms combine
their landfill and related assets in a region. No one has yet
propounded any case for disposal efficiencies, and none are immediately
evident.
But
with regard to nonfranchised residential or commercial collection,
it is conceptually true that greater route densities may lead
to improved efficiency. This can occur because in competitive
markets, many haulers may run their trucks down the same street
with, for example, one hauler collecting from the first and third
establishment on the block, another hauler from the second and
fourth establishment, and so on. Consequently, each truck will
dissipate part of its time driving by establishments that are
customers of competing haulers, with the result that the time
between each stop will be longer.
The
extent of these potential efficiency improvements, however, needs
to be carefully computed before any specific level of importance
can be attached to it. As stated by the Justice Department: "Efficiency
claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative
or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means." The
purpose of this analysis is to calculate this efficiency claim.
If
a verifiable analysis establishes that these gains exist, then
the prospect that the improvement will be realized and (if realized)
reflected in lower prices needs to be evaluated to warrant giving
it consideration as an offset to losses in competition. That is
to say that the possibility of improved collection efficiencies
from greater route densities that flow from consolidation creates
its own set of impediments to competition. It means that to succeed,
a new entrant will not only need capital to purchase a few packer
trucks, but also to operate at a loss until it builds a customer
base with route densities similar to those of the dominant consolidator.
In addition, of course, the higher market concentration ratios
implied by those densities can create a dominant firm with market
power.
Analysis
Unfortunately,
it is difficult to assign a single value to the potential for
efficiency gains because, among other thingsincluding the
extent to which the two merging firms' customers neatly meshthe
answer is very sensitive to local conditions. Two of the primary
factors that will vary from region to region, and even from route
to route, are:
- The
time to set up at each stop (including driving into and
out of the site, opening and closing any gates, lining up the
containers, and cycling the load) and
- The
time between stops.
It
is the time between stops that defines the cost component that
most improves when route density increases. However, at the same
time, it must be recognized that 30-40% of the operators'
day is spent going to and from the route, offloading, and taking
breaks. And depending on route densities, as much or twice as
much time will be spent at the stop as between stops, and that
time is not affected by higher densities. Also, approximately
one-third of the total haul cost is associated with tipping fees
at the landfill. Since neither the time spent away from collection
nor the time spent at each stop, not to mention the charges at
the landfill, directly changes with greater route densities, the
overall efficiency gains from those higher densities are significantly
dampened.
To
supply an answer that can be applied across a variety of different
local conditions, we have prepared the following chart that provides
a sensitivity analysis as a function of the two factors identified
above. Although this will not provide an answer for every particular
situation, it will provide a framework to undertake these evaluations
in the future, and it will lay out the answers in representative
situations not unlike the case in most regions of the country.
Because
solid waste collection costs are nonlinear, discretely modeling
each assumption is required. Step functions are used to
track the way in which waste-handling systems operate in the real
world. With step functions, an effect does not arise with each
increment in a causative event. Rather, some threshold level of
that cause must first be reached before the effect occurs.
To
illustrate, the primary step function in waste handling relates
to the fact that when the collection vehicle tops out, it must
go off-route, typically for more than an hour, to offload. Until
that point is reached, however, no time is lost for tipping. On
a given route, it is the particular relationship of truck capacity,
packing ratio, pickup rates, quantities set out, hours worked,
and time to the landfill that, in turn, determines how soon the
truck fills up, leaves the route to unload, and then returns to
continue collection.
The
general assumptions used are as follows: a $105,000 purchase cost
for a 25-yd. rearloader that achieves a 5:1 packing ratio; one
operator earning $20/hour in wages and benefits, working 7.5 effective
hours in a nine-hour day, collecting solid waste with a 200-lb./yd.3
density, and unloading one-hour roundtrip from the route at a
facility with a $30/ton tip fee; and a 23% overall return on investment
on the vehicle and containers before taxes. The resulting calculation,
which was done for a two-yard container collected twice weekly,
estimates the haul charge across the range of possible scenarios.
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Table
1. Monthly Cost of Commercial Collection
(2-yd.
container twice weekly)
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Minutes
Between Stop
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Percent
Difference
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1
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2
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3
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4
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(4
to 1)
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(4
to 2)
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(4
to 3)
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Minutes
to Set Up
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5
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$93
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$100
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$116
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$124
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-25.0%
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-19.4%
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-6.5%
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6
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$100
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$116
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$124
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$132
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-24.2%
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-12.1%
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-6.1%
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7
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$116
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$124
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$132
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$139
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-16.5%
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-10.8%
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-5.0%
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8
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$124
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$132
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$139
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$147
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-15.6%
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-10.2%
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-5.4%
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Table
2. Linear Regression for Each
Time
at Stop
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Time
at Stop
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Regression*
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R2
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5
minutes
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y
= 81+10.9x
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0.98
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6
minutes
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y
= 92+10.4x
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0.97
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7
minutes
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y
= 108.5 + 7.7x
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0.99
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8
minutes
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y
= 116.5 + 7.6x
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0.99
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If
the resulting plots for the different "minutes between stops"
on this table are linear for a given "minutes to set up,"
then it will be possible to use these values to estimate overall
costs under a variety of other conditions that may occur under
various types of mergers, at least so long as the extrapolation
is within or reasonably close to the boundary conditions specified
in Table 1.
That
this is the case is shown by a calculation of a best fitting line
for the data points from Table 1 using the regression analysis
set forth in Table 2, as reflected in the R2 values
for the equations (a statistical measure of goodness of fit) that
turn out to be very close to 1 (which describes a perfect fit
along a straight line). Figure 1 plots the data for each "minutes
to set up" on a graph, also showing them as very close to
straight lines.
In
order to provide a general assessment of the typical improvement
in a merger, we postulate a national consolidator with 40% haul
market share in a local geographic market. In the first scenario
it acquires a small private hauler with 5% market share; in the
second, a regional publicly traded firm with a 20% market share;
and in the third, another national publicly traded company with
an equal 40% market share. The resulting market shares for each
scenario, then, would rise to 45%, 60%, and 80%, respectively.
Table
3 shows the relative market shares under each assumption before
and after the mergers for the merging firms, as well as the nonmerging
firms, with the shares shown in italics representing the firms
that are merging.
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Table
3. Hypothetical Market Shares Under Each Scenario
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National/
Independent
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Before
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40%
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20%
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20%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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After
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45%
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20%
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20%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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National/
Regional
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Before
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40%
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20%
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20%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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After
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60%
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5%
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20%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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National/
National
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Before
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40%
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40%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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|
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After
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80%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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5%
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The
question for the claim that there are significant efficiency gains
can be simplified to how much the time between stops is reduced
as the resulting route densities improve. In the case where the
initial time between each potential customer is two minutes, the
consolidator with a 40% share would average five minutes between
the commercial establishments that have signed up as customers.
To that would have to be added the time at each stopperhaps
five, six, seven, or eight minutesto estimate the total
time per stop on a route.
The
average time between stops for the expanded market share after
acquiring a small firm of 45% would work out to 4.44 minutes;
after acquiring a regional and realizing a 60% share, 3.33 minutes;
and after acquiring another national making an 80% share, 2.50
minutes.
To
convert these reductions in the time between stops to overall
operational costs, we used the regression equations for each "time
at stop" shown in Table 2 for each hypothetical "time
at stop." The results show how the overall cost to collect
solid waste from the hypothetical commercial customer varies as
route densities increase in the form of shorter times between
stops (namely, from five minutes with the base 40% market share
to 4.44 minutes with 45% share, 3.34 minutes with 60% share, and
2.50 minutes with 80% share), as shown in Table 4.
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Table
4. Relationship Between Cost and Improved Route Densities
($/Customer/Month)
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Time
at Stop
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Before
and After Market Shares Following Mergers
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Before
(40%)
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After
(45%)
National/
Independent
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After
(60%)
National/
Regional
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After
(80%)
National/
National
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5
minutes
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$135.50
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$129.40
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$117.30
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$108.25
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% Gain
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n/a
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4.5%
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13.4%
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20.1%
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6
minutes
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$144.00
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$138.18
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$126.63
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$118.00
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% Gain
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n/a
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4.0%
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12.1%
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18.1%
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7
minutes
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$147.00
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$142.69
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$134.14
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$127.75
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% Gain
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n/a
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2.9%
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8.7%
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13.1%
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8
minutes
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$154.50
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$150.24
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$141.81
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$135.50
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%
Gain
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n/a
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2.8%
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8.2%
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12.3%
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Application
of Results
Table
4 shows varying potential for efficiency improvement through greater
route densities made possible by mergers. Under the range of hypothetical
mergers evaluated here, the cost savings extend from approximately
3% to 20%, with the median case in the order of 10%.
However,
the simple fact that some of the scenarios suggest that there
is a theoretical potential for significant efficiency gains (e.g.,
those that are in excess of 10%) is not, by itself, sufficient
to justify a merger.
For
one thing, there is a substantial body of empirical analysis that
has found that businesses without competitive pressures suffer
from what has been coined "X-inefficiencies," or the
desire to live the comfortable life. Undoubtedly, investor pressures
to improve earnings while USA Waste Services struggles to absorb
Waste Management's assets, as well as with Allied and BFI,
will goad managers to aggressively streamline routes. However,
in the future, if profit-maximizing oligopoly pricing follows,
X-inefficiencies may arise throughout the systems. This would
need to be considered.
In
addition, it has been empirically established that, at some point,
the market power derived from very high-concentration ratios resulting
from mergers makes it possible for the merged firm to capture
any gains instead of sharing them with the consumer. As stated
in the Justice Department's Horizontal Merger Guidelines,2
"Competition
usually spurs firms to achieve efficiencies internally. Nevertheless,
mergers have the potential to generate significant efficiencies
by permitting a better utilization of existing assets, enabling
the combined firm to achieve lower costs in producing a given
quantity and quality than either firm could have achieved
without the proposed transaction. Indeed, the primary benefit
of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate such
efficiencies
.
"Even
when efficiencies generated through merger enhance a firm's
ability to compete, however, a merger may have other effects
that may lessen competition and ultimately may make the merger
anticompetitive....
"The
Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies
are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not
likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.... To
make the requisite determination, the Agency considers whether
cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse
the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market,
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market. In conducting
this analysis...the Agency will not simply compare the magnitude
of the cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely
harm to competition absent the efficiencies. The greater the
potential adverse competitive effect of a merger...the greater
must be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to
conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive
effect in the relevant market. When the potential adverse
competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly
large, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies would
be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive.
"In
the Agency's experience, efficiencies are most likely to make
a difference in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive
effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great. Efficiencies
almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly."
There
are several measuring sticks used by economists to evaluate the
extent to which market concentration affects competition. The
Herfinahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the one used by the Justice
Department because of, in part, its ability to reflect the disproportionately
greater impacts of larger firms on competitive interactions.
Table
5 shows the HHI values before and after the postulated mergers
in the three scenarios evaluated in this paper, namely a merger
of a national firm with, first, an independent; second, a regional;
and third, another national. It also shows the point difference
between the before and after values, as well as the percent change.
According
to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, HHI values below 1,000
are considered unconcentrated; between 1,000 and 1,800, moderately
concentrated; and above 1,800, highly concentrated. General standards
are then laid out for how each stratum shall be considered as
part of a merger review when the postmerger HHI falls in each
region.2
In
the market relationships hypothesized herewhich are common
in the MSW industry in most regions todaythe premerger HHI
values are already in the range considered to be highly concentrated.
In any event, regarding a postmerger HHI above 1,800, the Guidelines
states: "The Agency regards markets in this region to be
highly concentrated. Mergers producing an increase in the HHI
of less than 50 points, even in highly concentrated markets post-merger,
are unlikely to have adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily
require no further analysis. Mergers producing an increase in
the HHI of more than 50 points in highly concentrated markets
post-merger potentially raise significant competitive concerns.
Where the post-merger HHI exceeds 1,800, it will be presumed that
mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points
are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise...."2
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Table
5. Impact of Hypothetical Mergers on HHI
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Before
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After
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%
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National/Independent
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2,500
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2,900
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400
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16%
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National/Regional
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2,500
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4,100
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1,600
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64%
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National/National
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3,300
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6,500
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3,200
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97%
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As
shown in Table 5, here the HHI point increase is from 400 to 3,200depending
on whether the combination is of a national with an independent,
a regional, or another nationalwhich is outside the 50-point
perimeter established by the Justice Department.
Figure
2 brings together data from Tables 4 and 5 to show the relationship
between efficiency gains as a percent of HHI point increases for
the three scenarios considered, namely the merger of a national
with an independent, a regional, and another national consolidator.
As can be seen, the negative impacts from consolidation (in the
form of increased HHI points) increase exponentially for very
small increments of efficiency gains.
Conclusions
Essentially,
the solid waste industry as depicted in the scenarios in this
article is already so highly concentrated that the postmerger
HHI from almost any merger would seem to contravene the Justice
Department's general guidelines. Moreover, only in the case
of the largest mergers, illustrated by the combination of two
major firms each with 40% market share, are the collection efficiencies
really substantial.
However,
at that level of combination, the HHI measure of market concentration
would approach 6,500more than three times the 1,800 level
at which the Justice Department considers the market to be highly
concentrated. That is to say that in order to see significant
efficiency gains, the combination would have to impose an unacceptable
threat to competition. As such, any realized gains cannot be expected
to be shared with the consumer.
That
is the case even before considering whether entry by new firms
could be sustained to possibly offset concerns over market power
impacts. As noted previously, since landfills are a bottleneck
in the solid waste industry, this will substantially turn on the
ready availability of competitively priced disposal capacity for
an independent hauler that is not vertically integrated with its
own landfill. A complementary analysis of concentration in the
market for disposal by geographic market would be a useful adjunct
to this article in order to complete the analysis called for in
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
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