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H. Lanier
Hickman Jr.
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Part
9b: A Reverse Marshall Plan
Links
to other parts of our series may be found at the end
of this article.
By H. Lanier
Hickman Jr.
Part
9a (September/October 2001) looked at the early part
of 1950-2000. Part 9b looks at the latter half of this
period that was the golden expansion years of waste-to-energy
(WTE) and the failure of its continued growth.
Running parallel
to the development of refuse-derived fuel (RDF) was
the introduction of European mass-burn technologies
to the United States. While the federal government was
supporting RDF development, it was also working with
local governments to consider mass burn. A series of
technical assistance and training efforts were provided
to encourage the marriage of private entrepreneurs (vendors)
and local governments to move toward a turnkey approach
to procure WTE capacity.
Steve Levy
of the USEPA solid waste program was sent to Europe
in the mid-1970s to study approaches to incineration
and WTE. Dave Sussman also visited Europe to look at
European WTE approaches. From these visits, the federal
program initiated a study to define the state-of-the-art
in European refuse-fired energy systems. The findings
of this study were published in 1978. The major outcome
of these visits resulted in a series of seminars given
around the US to present a technology and management
of resource recovery. In addition, a number of implementation
grants were given under President Carter’s President’s
Urban Policy (PUP) to local governments to help them
assess and prepare for implementation of resource recovery
(primarily WTE projects).
The major
results from this EPA work included:
- the development
of a management model to assist local governments
to plan and implement resource recovery,
- the adoption
of the European request-for-proposal (RFP)/turnkey
approach to procured WTE services, and
- the construction
of approximately 30 WTE plants.
In addition
to the US Public Health Service (USPHS)/EPA solid waste
program, the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) began operations in 1975. Charged with a mission
to develop new energy technologies, ERDA actively studied
and supported the use of resource recovery as an alternative
and new energy technology. ERDA established an MSW program
and hired Don Walter as the program manager. Results
of an early ERDA/solid waste program study resulted
in a major focus on recovering energy from solid waste.
In 1977, just prior to leaving office, President Ford
recommended the formation of a Department of Energy
(DOE). Shortly after assuming office, President Carter
created the DOE. ERDA was one of the linchpins forming
the new DOE. Over the next several years WTE investments
increased, and major funding began to flow toward the
end of the 1970 decade.
As the DOE
was tooling up its WTE program, EPA was using the Resource
Recovery Act as its legislative mandate to expand its
outreach program for WTE. Using the European RFP approach,
the Section 208 grants and supported research and development,
technical assistance and PUP grants, and favorable US
tax laws, a reverse Marshall Plan emerged for mass-burn
systems. European mass-burn technologies established
partnerships with American companies to respond to local
government RFPs and WTE interests to build and operate
WTE facilities. The technologies most adopted were the
Martin grate and the Von Roll grate.
Chicago led
the way with the selection of the Martin grate system
and water-wall combustion chamber design. In expectation
of more increased air emission control, electrostatic
precipitators were installed. Steam was the product,
and a customer nearby provided a market for the steam.
Following closely after Chicago, three other local governments
selected the Martin grate system: Norfolk, VA; Harrisburg,
PA; and Braintree, MA. In all of these plants, local
governments were major investors.
Wheelabrator-Frye,
licensed by Von Roll, built the first of what has become
known as a "merchant" plant in Saugus, MA,
in the mid-1970s. Similar to Martin, Von Roll, a Swiss
company, was a major builder of plants in Europe and
around the world and the major competitor to Martin.
The plant was privately financed and built by Refuse
Energy Systems Company, a joint venture of Wheelabrator-Frye
and M. DeMatteo Construction Company. Operating problems,
caused primarily by the difference in US and European
solid wastes, required major modifications. Eventually
these problems were solved, and the plant continues
to operate successfully today.
The Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) set the stage
for rapid growth of WTE in the 1980s. A guarantee of
markets, through PURPA, and continued high energy prices
made it easier for WTE plants to obtain financing. By
1980, 60 plants were either on-line, under construction,
or in the planning stages. The Energy Security Act (ESA)
gave the DOE authorization to develop a comprehensive
plan to encourage the expansion of the US WTE industry.
The DOE was also given loan guarantee and technology
demonstration authorities to implement the ESA required
plan. The DOE MSW program received a very large budget
in fiscal year 1981 for both demonstrations and research
and development. When the Reagan administration took
office in 1981, however, the monies for demonstrations
were rescinded. Within only two years, the DOE budget
was reduced to a level of $1 million per year, resulting
in a very modest effort, mostly in new technologies.
A WTE
Explosion
In 1981,
as noted with the arrival of the Reagan administration,
funding for the DOE WTE program was rescinded. This
step dramatically altered the direction of the WTE industry.
Other approaches for support emerged through the private
sector, as the Reagan strategy for privatization of
WTE industry came on-line. The 1985 Tax Reform Act accelerated
the growth of WTE facilities. This law "grandfathered"
nearly 100 projects already in the planning or under-construction
stages, making them eligible for tax credits. A 1987
EPA study reported 110 WTE plants in operation and nearly
220 in the planning or construction stage. By 1990,
another 56 major and 27 minor plants had opened.
Some 20-plus
companies were heavily involved in the marketing of
WTE systems to local governments or in the establishment
of merchant plants. Four companies, however (Ogden-Martin,
Wheelabrator-Frye, American Ref-Fuel, and Combustion
Engineering), controlled more than half of the market.
Changes and consolidation of these companies began to
occur.
Wheelabrator-Frye
was purchased by Signal and became Wheelabrator Environmental
Systems. Signal had a license from Martin, and Wheelabrator
had a license from Von Roll. When Signal purchased Wheelabrator,
it was required by the Federal Trade Commission to sell
one of its licenses, which it did to the Ogden Corporation.
Wheelabrator eventually wound up with Waste Management.
Ogden formed
Ogden-Martin in 1983 and is the largest of the WTE service
providers today. Ogden Projects Inc. was formed in the
early 1990s and purchased three major RDF projects from
a European conglomerate.
American
Ref-Fuel was a jointly owned company of BFI and Air
Products. American Ref-Fuel continues to operate a number
of plants.
Combustion
Engineering was the major RDF vendor and built three
very large RDF plants in Detroit and Honolulu and for
the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority. It was
acquired by ABB in 1990, and ABB sold off the RDF plants
to Ogden Projects.
By 1996,
there were a total of 146 WTE plants in the US (Taylor
and Zannes, 1996), with a processing and burning design
capacity of 108,330 tpd.
Why Does
WTE Not Continue to Grow?
At the end
of the 1980s and into the early 1990s the future for
WTE looked bright, but circumstances changed very quickly
and growth stopped. A number of factors caused this
stoppage:
Tax
Credits. The favorable tax benefits of the Reform
Tax Act of 1985 disappeared, dramatically altering the
economics of WTE.
Megafills.
The emergence of the large, privately owned megafills
with low tipping fees made it difficult for more expensive
WTE plants to compete without a guaranteed put-or-pay
contract or a locked-in solid waste supply.
Environmentalists.
Some environmental groups actively opposed WTE and,
through misinformation and biased information, half-truths,
and even lies, led the public to believe that WTE prevented
recycling and poisoned the air with air emissions and
the groundwater from ash disposal. The resulting public
resistance has made it impossible to site new WTE facilities.
Lack
of Federal Leadership. The lack of federal leadership,
and visible opposition, by EPA to combustion and its
preference for waste reduction and recycling sent negative
signals to local governments and the public.
Federal
Court Decisions. The Carbone decision
impacted all aspects of solid waste management, most
notably the leakage of solid waste from local government
WTE facilities to cheaper megafills.
Air
Emission Regulations. New and costly regulations
have driven up the cost of WTE facilities, and cheaper
options (megafills) make these costs almost prohibitive.
Integrated
Solid Waste Management. As local governments
responded to EPA and state government pressures to plan
and implement integrated solid waste management systems,
several impediments occurred that made it difficult
to implement WTE. These impediments include appending
extra charges to tipping fees at WTE facilities to pay
for the costs for new programs (mandatory diversion
and recycling rates, banned materials, household hazardous
wastes, and so on) and the unwillingness of many local
government public policy-makers to assess the full costs
of integrated solid waste management to the users of
the system.
Consequently,
by the end of the last millennium, the number of WTE
plants had dropped from 146 to 109 and the design capacity
from 108,330 tpd to 103,003 tpd. No new plants have
been sited or built in the last decade, and none is
planned for the future. Even as the US faces greater
dependence on foreign oil, states refuse to intelligently
support alternate/renewable energy sources, the public
refuses to support the siting of any type of energy
facility, and the federal government lacks a sound and
logical energy policy.
WTE, an option
that is available and dependable, continues to be underdeveloped.
Reference
Taylor, A.
and M. Zannes. The 1996 IWSA Municipal Waste Directory
of United States Facilities. Integrated Waste Services
Association, Washington, DC. 1996.
H. Lanier
Hickman Jr., P.E., D.E.E., is a member of MSW Management’s
Editorial Advisory Board.
To
read the other parts in this feature please click on
the relevant links below:
Part
1: Introducing the Pioneers
Part
2: Of Mosquitoes, Flies, Rats, Swine, and Smoke
Part
3: The Sanitary Landfill
Part
4: Building a National Movement
Part
5a: Building an Infrastructure
Part
5b: Building an Infrastructure
Part
6: Collecting Solid Waste/No Longer Beasts of Burden
Part
7a: Landfill Gas Odors/Fires, Explosions, and Kilowatts
Part
7b: Landfill Gas - An Asset, Not a Liability
Part
8: Composting: Sometimes a Good Idea Does Not Sell
Part
9a: The
Awakening of Waste-to-Energy in the US
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